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The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation 
considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with 
the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an 
analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-
Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European 
level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also 
interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome 
the ―Euro Crisis‖. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include 
national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote 







Although  an  expression  of  commitment  to  the  rule  of  law  and  democracy  already 
appeared in the Maastricht Treaty
1, the problem of democratic deficit constitutes one of 
the most sensitive and controversial issues in the European Union today.
2  Recently 
published  studies  and  public  discussions  point  out  that  Member  States‘  citizens 
continuously feel badly represented within the European Union.
3 In addition, the on-
going  Euro Crisis seems to transform from a macro -economic phenomenon into a 
discourse  about  adequate  governance  structures  in  one  of  the  most  sophisticated 
international organisations.
4 Bearing in mind the events surrounding the ratification of 
the  European  Co nstitution
5  and  the  Lisbon  Treaty,
6  it  seems  inevitable  that  the 
European Union is about to face the same deadlock situation in which a decision 
between  firm  supranational  unification  and  loose intergovernmental  cooperation  is 
                                                 
1 According to Article F of the Maastricht Treaty ―the Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy‖, Treaty on 
European Union 1992 OJ C 191/1. 
2 J. Přib￡ň, Desiring a Democratic European Polity: The European Union Between the Constitutional 
Failure and the Lisbon Treaty in: The European Union after Lisbon, ed. H. Blanke, S. Mangiameli, Berlin 
2012, p. 71. 
3  C.  Seidl,  Österreicher  sehen  sich  in  der  EU  schlecht  vertreten,  Der  Standard,  16.07.2012;  D. 
Szeligowska, The European Citizens‟ Initiative – Empowering European Citizens within the Institutional 
Triangle: A Political and Legal Analysis, „Bruges Political Research Papers‖, no. 24/2012, p. 53. 
4  C.  Calliess,  Der  Kampf  um  den  Euro:  Eine  „Angelegenheit  der  Europäischen  Union“  zwischen 
Regierung, Parlament und Volk, „NVwZ Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht‖, no. 1/2012, p. 7; A. 
Voßkuhle, Die Verfassung gilt auch in der Krise, „Der Spiegel online―, http://bit.ly/MdWc4d [access: 
17.07.2012]; S. Kuzmany,  Lasst uns abstimmen!, „Der Spiegel online―,  http://bit.ly/QB5xZE [access: 
08.08.2012];  M. Aden,  Europa  als  Rechtsraum  angesichts  der  Eurokrise,  „Recht  der  internationalen 
Wirtschaft―, no. 8/2012, p. 1; Conclusions of the European Council of 28-29.06.2012, EUCO 76/12, p. 
15. 
5 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004 OJ C310/1.  
6 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community 2006 OJ C306/1. 5 
 
required.
7 Under such conditions, sensible and pragmatic decision making processes 
become unpopular and almost impossible.
8 
While some academics try to define which lessons can be learned from the 
transfer of powers from European national states to the EU regarding similar processes 
of integration  on  a  global  scale,
9  citizens  of  the  Member States  fear  the loss  of 
democratic control regarding the most important political issues. The democratic deficit 
within the European Union is mainly associated with the powers of the European 
Parliament  (the  narrow  meaning), but  originally  this  concept  is  much  wider. The 
essence of democratic deficit is expressed in an opinion that the European Union and its 
various bodies suffer from a lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy, moreover 
they seem inaccessible to ordinary citizens because their operating method is very 
complex, opaque and remote.
10 Taking into consideration the second, wider approach of 
democratic deficit, it is important to recall not only the role of the European Parliament 
within the European Union but also the role of national parliaments as an embodiment 
of  representative  democracy  at  the  national  level.
11  Undeniably,  despite  various 
similarities, the European Parliament and national parliaments differ within the scope of 
                                                 
7 See I. Pernice, La Rete Europea di Costituzionalità – Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund und die 
Netzwerktheorie, „Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht―, no. 1/2010, p. 52; J. 
Habermas, Die Krise der Europäischen Union im Lichte einer Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts – 
Ein Essay zur Verfassung Europas, „Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht―, no. 
1/2012, p. 1. 
8 M. Draghi, The future of the euro: stability through change, „Die Zeit―, 29.08.2012; T. Ackermann et. 
al., Editorial Comments – Debt and democracy: “United States then, Europe now”?, „Common Market 
Law Review‖, vol. 49, p. 1833. 
9 A. Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU 
Treaty for International Organizations, „European Journal of International Law―, no. 23/2012, p. 315. 
10 The European Commission has launched a number of initiatives in recent years to get in direct contact 
with the „EU‘s citizens‖ in order to make their role as Europeans more visible or better known; See The 
„Future of Europe‖ Consultation; COM, IP/12/923, 31.08.2012.   
11  M. Ruffert,  Institutionen,  Organe  und  Kompetenzen  –  der  Abschluss  eines  Reformprozesses  als 
Gegenstand  der  Europarechtswissenschaft  in:  Der  Reformvertrag  von  Lissabon,  ed.  J.  Schwarze, A. 
Hatje, „EuR Beiheft―, no. 1/2009, p. 35; R. Hrbek, The Role of National Parliaments in the EU 
in: The European Union after Lisbon, ed. H. Blanke, S.  Mangiameli, The European Union after Lisbon, 
Berlin 2012, p. 137; P. Craig, G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, New York 2011, pp. 57-
58. 6 
 
the structure, election and wielded entitlements. Thus, also their roles within the EU are 
not identical.
12 
This  becomes  already  visible  when  considering  the  composition  of  the 
legislative bodies on the national and the EU level. While national elections are be ing 
held  with  one  legal  regime  in  a  consolidated  space,  the  election  process  for  the 
European Parliament takes place in the twenty -seven Member States, its basic rules 
being laid down by twenty-seven (harmonized) national laws.
13 Only the results of these 
single separate votes are being passed on to the common European level, where the 
outcomes have to be transformed from fragments to what becomes in the end a mosaic 
entitled to legislate in the European Union. Clearly, this difference in composition 
substantially  influences  the  subsequent  political  processes,  first  and  foremost 
manifesting in the lack of genuine European parties representing the totality of the 
population of the five hundred million European citizens. 
Another issue, which is also highly  related to the role of national parliaments 
within the European Union, concerns the division and control of competences between 
the  Union  and  the  Member  States,  as  well  as  related  principles  of  subsidiarity, 
proportionality and the principle of conferral.
14 The dimensions of, and links between, 
these three key aspects of European Integration are subject of constant discussion.
15 
                                                 
12 See the Commission‘s Communication, ‗A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union‘ (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final, which states that ‗[t]he European Parliament, and only 
it, is that Parliament for the EU (...), ensuring democratic legitimacy for EU institutions‟ decisions. At the 
same time, the role of national parliaments will always remain crucial in ensuring legitimacy of Member 
States‟ action in the European council and the Council.‘ 
13 Cf. Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the 
right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union 
residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals; further for Germany the Gesetz über die Wahl 
der Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Europawahlgesetz 
- EuWG) - Europawahlgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 8. März 1994 (BGBl. I S. 423, 
555), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 G. vom 17. März 2008 (BGBl. I S. 394) geändert worden ist. 
14 N. Foster, Foster on EU Law, New York 2011, p. 83; A. Nguyen, Die Subsidiaritätsrüge des Deutschen 
Bundesrates gegen den Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, „ZEuS 
Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien―, no. 3/2012, p. 6. 
15  V. Trstenjak, E. Beysen,  Das  Prinzip  der  Verhältnismäßigkeit  in  der  Unionsrechtsordnung,  „EuR 
Europarecht―, no. 3/2012, p. 266. 7 
 
While  the  competences  of  the  European  Union  have  been  broadened  over  the  past 
decades, the prerogatives of national parliaments have been substantially reduced in 
relation to the European institutions.
16 It should be mentioned that the creation of the 
European Union was inseparably connected with the formation of new institutional 
structures and decision-making processes which from the very beginning exceeded the 
rules of functioning of parliamentarism at the national level. In other words, the process 
of  European integration resulted in surrendering legislative competence of national 
parliaments to supranational European Union institutions, which constituted the primary 
reason for deparliamentarisation.
17 This is especially visible in recent times, as Member 
States  and  the  European  Union  try  to  solve  the  Euro  Crisis  by  setting  up  new 
intergovernmental  and  EU  facilities  like  the  European  F inancial  Stability  Facility 
(EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
18 The European Union is often 
seen  as  „a  classical  case  of  a  gradual  process  of  de-democratisation  through 
integration‖,
19  whereas  national  parliaments  are  being  described  as  ―victims‖  and 
―losers‖.
20  Drawing  the  borders  between  the  national  and  international  actors  is  an 
ongoing process shaped by politicians, national and EU officials and especially national 
high courts, which are often seen as the only legitimate ―guardians‖ of their national 
constitutions.
21  This has also been highlighted most recently in the debate over the 
                                                 
16 A. Cygan, The Parliamentarisation of EU Decision-Making? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
National Parliaments, „European Law Review‖, no. 36/2011, p. 480. 
17 A. Cygan, National parliaments within the EU polity – no longer losers but hardly victorious, „ERA 
Forum―, no. 4/2012, p. 518. 
18 H. Steiger, Mehr Demokratie in der EU – aber wie?, „Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik―, no. 5/2012, p.14; 
M.  Nettesheim,  Verfassungsrecht  und  Politik  in  der  Staatsschuldenkrise,  „Neue  Juristische 
Wochenschrift―, no. 20/2012, p. 1409. 
19 A. Maurer, National Parliaments after Amsterdam: Adaptation, Re-Calibration and Europeanisation 
by process in: Paper for Working Group Meeting, XXIVth COSAC, p. 6. 
20 J. O‘Brennan, T. Raunio, National parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From „victims‟ of 
integration  to  competitive  actors?,  London  2007,  p.  8;  P.  Norton,  Parliaments  and  Governments  in 
Western Europe, London 2011, pp. 1-15. 
21 U. Everling,  Europas Zukunft unter der Kontrolle der nationalen Verfassungsgerichte Anmerkungen 
zum  Urteil  des  Bundesverfassungsgerichts  vom  30.  Juni 2009  über den  Vertrag  von Lissabon,  „EuR 
Europarecht―,  no.  1/2010,  p.  91;  A.  Hatje,  Demokratische  Kosten  souveräner  Staatlichkeit  im 
europäischen Verfassungsverbund, „EuR Beiheft―, no. 1/2010, p. 124. 8 
 
―ESM-ruling‖  of  the  German  constitutional  court,
22  whose  political  weight  and 
implications were very much disputed all over Europe.
23 
 
1.  The role of national parliaments under the Lisbon Treaty 
Undoubtedly,  the  strong  position  of  parliaments  as  legislators  within  representative 
democracies is one of the cornerstones of western democracies as we know them.
24 
According to Article 10.1 TEU also the ―functioning of the Union‖ is based upon this 
form  of  governance.
25  However,  the  European  Union  in  the  year  2012  is  still  a 
community capable of acting because the Member States pass on their sovereignty to an 
international organisation. In other terms, it is the national parlia ments who have to be 
considered as the original roots of power of the European Union, even if there is a 
strong tendency to forget this in regard of the economic and political potential of ―The 
United States of Europe‖.
26 Nevertheless, the most important decisions still have to be 
taken  by  national  legislators.
27  This aspect was strongly emphasized, supported and 
manifested  by  the  rulings  of  different  constitutional  courts,  including  the  Czech, 
German, Polish, Spanish and the French Conseil d‘État.
28 Referring to Montesquieu's 
tripartite system,
29 national parliaments represent the whole population by carrying out 
legislative state power, which is then completed by the executive and the judiciary. 
However, parliaments are not only appointed to approve simple leg islation and control 
the government, furthermore they are responsible for amending the constitution, which 
                                                 
22 BVerfG, 2 BvT 1390/12. 
23 P. Jendroszczyk, Pomoc Niemiec w zawieszeniu, „Rzeczpospolita―, 11.07.2012; P.  Buras, Wspólna 
Europa. Reaktywacja, „Gazeta Wyborcza‖, 13.09.2012. 
24 A. Cygan, National parliaments…, op. cit., p. 518. 
25 See A. Bogdandy, op. cit., p. 323. 
26 The term „United States of Europe― was used inter alia by Winston Churchill in his speech delivered 
on 9 September 1946 at the University of  Zürich, Switzerland. 
27 See M. Nettesheim, op. cit., p. 1410; with reference to the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 123, 
267. 
28  A.  Weber,  Der  Vertrag  vom  Lissabon  vor  dem  polnischen  Verfassungsgericht,  ―Europäische 
Grundrechte Zeitschrift‖, no. 5-9/2012, p. 140. 
29 C. De Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748. 9 
 
is the central legal and only legitimate source for all activities of the regime and the 
administrative branch of a state. Therefore, securing the parliament‘s position on the 
national and the European level is also crucial for establishing and maintaining the rule 
of law within the political entities. 
Along  with  developing  Europeanization,  which  means  the  creation  of  the 
European Union as well as the subsequent process of European integration, the role of 
national parliaments has changed. The crucial moment came in the first direct election 
for  the  European  Parliament,  in  1979  (since  1979  the  European  Parliament  has  no 
longer been formed by members of national parliaments; although a dual mandate was 
not forbidden).
30 The side effect of this generally positive event, which is considered to 
bring additional democratic accountability to the EU, was the impairment of bonds 
between the national parliaments and the European institutions.
31 The system of direct 
elections for the European Parliament has created and maintained a distance between 
national  parliaments  and  the  European  institutions.  At  the  same  time  their  direct 
influence on EU affairs is being reduced significantly. 
As a result of the expansion of the  Europeanization process, the problem of the 




34 tried to resolve this problem. They contributed to improving 
the democratic legitimacy of the institutional system by strengthening the powers of the 
European Parliament, but at the same time, the issue of the role of national parliaments 
                                                 
30 J. Twieg, Die Rolle der nationalen Parlamente in der europäischen Integration vom EGKSV bis zum 
Vertrag von Lissabon, Norderstedt 2009, p. 16; Dual mandates at the European Parliament are entirely 
prohibited as of 2009, see Council Decision 2002 OJ L283/1. 
31 M. Chardon, Mehr Transparenz und Demokratie – Die Rolle nationaler Parlamente nach dem Vertrag 
von  Lissabon,  in:  Lissabon  in  der  Analyse.  Der  Reformvertrag  der  Europäischen  Union,  ed.  W. 
Weidenfeld, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 173. 
32 Treaty on European Union 1992 OJ C191/1. 
33 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts 1997 OJ C340/1. 
34  Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts 2001 OJ C80/1. 10 
 
within the European Union seemed to be overlooked.  The slight shifts of legislative 
power from the Council to the European Parliament, which is according to Eurostat 
figures  trusted  only  by  about  the  half  of  the  EU‘s  population,
35  could  simply  not 
compensate for the loss of competences of national legislators to the Union as such. 
The Lisbon Treaty,
36 which entered into force on 1 December 2009,  takes a 
different approach that was designed in order to overcome these shortcomings entirely 
and foster the citizens‘ trust in democratic decision making in the European Union.
37 It 
reinforces not only the powers of the European Parliament (democratic legitimacy at the 
European level), but also the powers of national parliaments (democratic legitimacy at 
the national level).
38 
Moreover, reinforcing the powers of national parliaments in European matters is 
widely recognized as one of the most important political reforms introduced by the 
Lisbon legal framework.
39 The new entitlements of national parliaments were designed 
to improve the p articipation in the EU decision -making process and to fill the gap 
between European citizens and the European Union institutions.
40  Nevertheless the 
introduction of such amendments at this stage is quite surprising if one takes into 
consideration  that  at  th e  beginning,  national  parliaments  were  peripheral  to  the 
development  of  European  integration ,  and  their  democratic  features  were  largely 
ignored.  
                                                 
35  Eurostat,  Trust  of  Citizens  in  EU  Institutions,  table  available  under:  http://bit.ly/VORUZj  [access: 
22.01.2013]. 
36 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community 2006 OJ C306/1. 
37 This new political approach is also considered to express the recent EU‘s drive for a new culture in 
European inter-institutional affairs. See M. Šefcovic, New role of national Parliaments under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Speech at the Conference organised by the C.E.P.C, Real Instituto Elcano and Fundación Manuel 
Giménez Abad Madrid, 22 October 2010. 
38 J. Přib￡ň, op. cit., p. 75. 
39 http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/oide/ [access: 12.05.2012]. 
40 C. Mellein, Die Rolle von Bundestag und Bundesrat in der Europäischen Union, „EuR Beiheft―, no. 
1/2011,  p.  48;  A.  Cygan,  National  parliaments…,  op.  cit.,  p.  518;  S.  Kurpas,  B.  Crum,  National 
Parliaments  and  the  Subsidiarity  Principle  in:  The  Treaty  of  Lisbon:  Implementing  the  institutional 
innovations, „CEPS Special Reports― 2007, p. 88. 11 
 
Put  simply,  one  could  argue  that  executives  of  the  European  Union  have 
relatively late realized that national parliaments, from which they themselves are often 
drawn, have a very distinct role to play in the enlarged European Union.
41 The head of 
states and ministers who compose the European Council and the Council accordingly, 
are appointed internally through political systems of Member States and therefore are by 
and large accountable to national parliaments.
42 Thus, the role of national parliaments 
should  remain  crucial  in  ensuring  legitimacy  of  Member  States‘  action  both  in  the 
European Council and the Council. However, practice shows that this is not the case, 
making  it  necessary  to  close  the  gap  between  national  and  European  legislative 
processes through changes of the primary law of the EU.  
Hence,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  European  Union,  national 
parliaments are now mentioned in the main text of the Treaty (under the Treaty of 
Maastricht the role of national parliaments within the European Union was regulated by 
non-binding Declaration No 13
43; the Amsterdam Treaty contained the Protocol on the 
Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
44).
45 Probably the most important 
Treaty provision on the role of national parliaments within the European Union is 
Article 12 TEU which states that ―national Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union‖.
46 Although the Treaty of Lisbon provides for an increased 
role for national parliaments, it does so in a separate provision to the provisions on the 
institutions of the European Union under Article 13.1 TEU, suggesting that national 
                                                 
41 A. Cygan, National parliaments…, op. cit., p. 517. 
42 Cf. Article 23 lit. e of the Austrian Constitution ( B-VG), which introduced such responsibilities after 
the accession of Austria to the EU in 1995. 
43 Declaration on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union 1992 OJ C191/1. 
44 Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 1997 OJ C340/1. 
45 Articles 5.3, 10.2 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) refer directly to the position of 
national parliaments within the European Union. 
46 K. Fischer, Der Vertrag von Lissabon. Text und Kommentar zum Europäischen Reformvertrag, Vern 
2010, p. 146. 12 
 
parliaments are not intended to be at the heart of the Union, but instead are to remain 
secondary players.
47 
1.1 The “early warning mechanism” 
The monitoring of subsidiarity could be perceived as the greatest improvement 
to the entitlements of national parliaments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The legal 
foundation for the possibility to ensure the compliance of EU actions with the principle 
of  subsidiarity  arises  from  Protocol  No  2
48  in conjunction with Article 5.3 TEU. 
Protocol No 2 establishes the so -called  ―early  warning  mechanism‖,  which  may  be 
described  as  a  pre-legislative  constitutional  intervention  device.
49  Through  its  use, 
national parliaments have the possibility to directly inform the Commission, or other 
initiating bodies, whenever a legislative proposal does not, in their opinion, comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity.
50 Active participation of national legislators shall be made 
possible on the Union‘s level. This prerogative could be regarded as the parliament‘s 
future  key  task  within  the  European  Union.  However,  one  of  the  most  important 
requirements  in  order  to  apply  the  mechanism  is  a  requirement  of  a  strengthened 
horizontal political dialogue between national parliaments.
51  
One could say that the collective monitoring introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
is intended to change the position of parliaments from isolated individual actors in 
European Union affairs to a  proactive horizontal bloc which determines subsidiary 
according to a uniform set of criteria.
52 The early warning mechanism gives them an 
                                                 
47 D. Chalmers, G. Monti, European Union Law. Updating Supplement, Cambridge 2008, p. 42. 
48 C. Mellein, op. cit., p. 49. 
49 A. Cygan, The Parliamentarisation… op. cit., p. 484. 
50 R. Streinz, C. Ohler, Der Vetrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU, Munich 2010, pp. 73-74. 
51 C. Mellein, op. cit., p. 51; P. Kaczynski, Paper tigers or sleeping beauties? National Parliaments in the 
post-Lisbon European Political System, „CEPS Special Reports― 2011, p. 8. 
52 A. Cygan, National Parliaments... op. cit., p. 527. 13 
 
opportunity to challenge the compliance of a legislative proposal with the subsidiarity 
principle (ex ante control).
53  
Nevertheless  it  is  important  to  note  that  an  effective  use  of  the  mechanism 
necessitates an achievement of substantial consensus between the individual actors.
54 
The requirement for the establishment of this form of horizontal dialogue between 
national legislators has been seen as problematic. According to early experiences, 
national parliaments are far from actively making use of the described mechanism.
55 
Even in the case of controversial legislation, such as the Directive on the application of 
patients‘  rights  in  cross-border  healthcare,
56  national  parliaments  are  not  always 
galvanised  into  putting  forward  concerns  about  compliance  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.  
This may also be connected with the fact that it remains so far unclear what 
exactly the parliaments can refer to when claiming that the principle of subsidiarity has 
been violated. Does this for instance also include the possibility to complain because of 
the violation of the principle of conferral as it is laid down in Article 5.2 TEU? And 
what about subsidiarity and proportionality? Most likely, important details of how to 
apply the procedure still have to be defined by further legislative acts, rulings of the 
ECJ and the practice of national actors. At least the German ―Bundesrat‖
57 seems to 
believe that the new mechanism enables the chamber to raise its concerns also regarding 
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the other two mentioned principles, because due to their nature they are inextricably 
connected with what subsidiarity consists of.
58 
Without any doubt, the monitoring of subsidiarity remains an important political 
task which was created for those institutions which have an interest in its application. In 
academic literature, the early warning mechanism is mentioned as a possibility for 
national parliaments to be more dire ctly engaged in EU affairs. Consequently, the 
monitoring of subsidiarity could help to prioritise EU subjects within national political 
debates.
59   
On the contrary, even though the introduction of the early warning procedure 
clearly  broadens  the  competence s  of  national  parliaments  within  European  Union 
affairs, there is still room for criticism. First of all, the warnings issued are of a non -
binding nature. Draft Union legislative acts can still be adopted regardless of opposition 
from national parliaments.
60 Although the Commission has the obligation to review the 
questioned draft legislative act if the thresholds mentioned in Protocol No 2 have been 
reached, it is not obliged to change the proposed act.
61 Secondly, one could argue that it 
is highly probable that the early warning mechanism will never be triggered at all. On 
the one hand, the required thresholds are unattainably high.
62 Although in 2011 there 
have been given 64 reasoned opinions by national parliaments to 28 different legislative 
proposals on the Union level, neither a ―yellow‖ or an ―orange‖ card procedure had to 
be  initiated.
63  These  opinions  were  mainly  concerned  with  the  fields  of  taxation, 
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61 P. Craig, op. cit., p. 47. 
62 According to Article 7 of Protocol No 2 every national parliament receives two votes, typically each of 
them being used by one of the two legislating chambers. In order for the mechanism to be applied, at least 
one third of these votes need to be used to flag a breach of the principle of subsidiarity and cause a review 
of the act. For legislative acts concerning the area of freedom, security and justice one fourth of the votes 
is sufficient.   
63 The early warning mechanism prov ides for two different procedures: ―yellow‖ and ―orange‖ cards, 
which require one-third and a simple majority of votes respectively in order to agree that a proposal 15 
 
agriculture,  internal  market  and  justice.
64  On the other hand, coordination between 
national parliaments is insufficient. Each parliament uses its own internal procedure for 
applying the mechanism.
65  Additionally, the foreseen time periods are prohibitively 
short in order to achieve parliamentary consensus on an international level.
66 Thirdly, 
the early warning mechanism cannot be perceived as the fulfilment of a procedural 
function as it can only be used by national parliaments at the tail end of the decision -
making process.
67 There is no direct involvement in the shaping of the legislative act as 
such. Last but not least, it must be pointed out that national parliaments can only 
indirectly enforce their position before the CJEU by filing a claim against the final 
legislative act.
68 In other words, the only non advisory form of control is of  ex post 
nature, taking the shape of a complex trial in Luxembourg.
69  In the meanwhile the 
undesired  effects  of  the already  enforced  legislative  act  may  even  make  such an 
intervention useless regarding the practical consequences. 
As  a  first  result  one  could  state  that  the  introduction  of  the  early  warning 
mechanism should be considered as a symbolic gesture towards the national legislators 
and the issue of democratic legitimization within the European Union. The mechanism 
lacks,  however,  a  legally  binding  nature,  which  would  help  to  transform  it  into  a 
gateway of genuine participation of national parliaments into the legislative process of 
the Union. 
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1.2 Strengthened right to obtain information 
The  second  important  improvement  introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  is  the 
strengthened right to obtain information. This entitlement stems from the provisions of 
Protocol No 1 which define this privilege of national parliaments. The raison d‘￪tre is to 
eliminate  the  existence  of  an  ―information  deficit‖  present  under  former  Treaty 
regimes.
70  
In  comparison  to  the Amsterdam Treaty  Protocol  on  the Role of  National 
Parliaments in the European Union, Protocol No 1 contains two elements, which have 
been  considerably  improved.  First  of  all,  the catalogue  of  documents  with  which 
national parliaments are  to be provided has been substantially extended. Currently, 
Protocol No 1 requires the provision of: Commission consultation documents, the 
annual legislative programme;
71 draft legislative acts (regardless of whether they are 
provided by the Commission, initiated by a group of Member States or the European 
Parliament or requested by the CJEU, the European Central Bank or the European 
Investment Bank);
72 Council agendas;
73 minutes and the annual report of the Court of 
Auditors.
74 The second and most significant improvement is the commitment to transfer 
adequate documents in all official languages directly to national parliaments.
75  The 
documents stated in Protocol No 1 are received by the parliaments directly from the 
Commission, or other drafting institutions.  In   effect,  all documents  are  accessible 
directly from the source. This improved flow of information creates a prerequisite for an 
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ensuing  political  dialogue.
76  A  direct  transfer  of  documents  is  a  noteworthy 
development, particularly because of the close connection between national parliaments‘ 
right  to  obtain  information  and  the  before  described  procedure  for  monitoring 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.
77 
1.3 National parliaments as actors in EU Foreign Policy 
Since the Union‘s foreign policy ―is subject to specific rules and procedures‖
78 
this particular policy field needs to be investigated separately. First of all, a distinction 
between the external aspects of the policies which are harmonised within the EU
79 and 
the ―classical‖ Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has to be made.
80 
For the latter mentioned area of policy, national legislators do have a  - almost 
surprisingly - strong position. The Lisbon Treaty revision does not change the CFSP‘s 
basic  character  as  a  forum  for  Member  States  to  coordinate  their  actions  on  the 
international level. The position of the European Institutions is weakened by the treaty 
framework compared to other fields of activity.
81 Classical inter-governmental decision 
making has to be applied almost exclusively, which is  also expressed by emphasizing 
the need of unanimity.
82 In consequence, the position of national parliaments is defined 
by their own national constitutions, specifically the relationship and responsibility of the 
executing organs towards the national legislators.
83 
This comes despite the fact that the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon resulted 
in some institutional changes, like the creation of the position of a High Representative 
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of  the  Union  for  Foreign Affairs  and  Security  Policy.
84  However, the fact th at the 
appointment of tasks between Member States and the Union in foreign policy is not an 
easy matter in practice can be studied by the slow progress made so far concerning the 
introduction  of  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS).  This  service  was  
designed to support the work of the High Representative.
85 
And although the influence of parliaments on the national level on decision 
making  of  their  representatives  is  relatively  strong,  the  described  ―early  warning 
mechanism‖ on EU level is not applicable, since it only works in reference to legislative 
acts.
86  All  of  the  national  parliamentarian‘s  information  on  CFSP  decision  making 
processes have to be drawn from the national executive organs or the media. These two 
aspects make it already visible that the ―strong‖ position of national legislators is in the 
end the result of the fact that a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU 
hardly exists. 
Considering  now  the  external  dimension  of  the  internally  harmonised  policy 
areas of the EU, the situation does not differ significantly from what has been described 
in general in the previous parts of this analysis. The most relevant treaty provision can 
be  found  in  Article  218  TFEU,  which  contains  the  general  rules  of  procedure  for 
concluding agreements with third parties.
87 
National parliaments have a crucial position however, when an agreement has to 
be concluded as ―mixed agreement‖. This is usually necessary when an international 
treaty  requires  that  Member  States  and  the  Union  sign  and  ratify  it  because  the 
allocation of competences between them is shared or unclear. In summary, this seems to 
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remain the only situation where one can clearly argue that a unified policy of the Union 
in a binding form exists and national parliaments, by blocking the required national 
ratification, do have direct influence on whether the relevant text will come into force or 
not.
88 
1.4 Résumé of the recent legal framework 
 Overall, the Lisbon Treaty has endeavoured to bring national parliaments from 
the margins of EU decision-making and render them within the EU polity. Articles 5.3, 
10.2 and 12 TEU, as well as Protocol No 1 and Protocol No 2 undeniably reinforce the 
powers of national parliaments and equip them with some new and strengthened rights. 
Nevertheless, even though the new provisions give national parliaments an opportunity 
to  play  a  more  active  role  within  the  European  Union  in  the  future,  they  have  not 
repositioned national parliaments as key actors within the European polity. The Treaty 
allocated no institutional status to national parliaments
89 nor are national parliaments 
situated within the legislative triangle. What can be mentioned positively though, is that 
the coming into force of the new rules has fostered the dialogue between national 
legislators and institutions of the Union, especially the European Commission.
90 In the 
post-Lisbon era it is clear, that national parliaments should have an influence on EU 
regulation in general, even if the legal quality and institutional positioning is not 
entirely defined yet. Maybe the current situation can be understood best if it is regarded 
as  being  the  start  of  a  new  process,  similar  to  what  happened  to  the  European 
Parliament over the last decades. 
In other words, now the future of national parliaments within the European 
Union is in their hands. It depends solely upon them h ow proactively they will use the 
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new provisions and how far they will meet the expectations in order to become an 
important institutional actor in the decision-making process of the European Union. 
 
2.  Scenarios for the future of national parliaments within the European Union 
The above discussion concerns the past and present situation of national parliaments 
within the European Union. In addition to this, a very important issue that should also 
be discussed is the future of national parliaments as actors in Europe. As has been 
shown  so  far,  under  the  current  legal  and  political  framework,  national  parliaments 
remain  mainly  national  actors.  They  can  only  legitimize  the  executive  organ‘s  acts 
within the EU, while they themselves do not exist as shaping factors of legislation on 
the European stage.
91  
It appears that the future of national parliaments within the European Union 
entirely depends upon the future of the European Union itself. More  Europeanization 
heading towards a federal European state (the already me ntioned  ―United  States  of 
Europe‖
92)  will  mean  less  power  for  national  parliaments.  And  vice  versa:  the 
emergence  of  stronger  interests  of  Member  States  within  European  integration  will 
increase  the  importance  of  national  parliaments  as  European  actors.  The  role  of 
transnational party groups in this process seems to be rather negligible.
93 
Nevertheless, one can speculate about consequences in the light of the recent 
developments both in Europe and the Union. The aforementioned first movement of 
stronger integration may eventually lead to new institutional reforms.
94 Such efforts 
would  definitely  be  taken  in  order  to  overcome  economic  hardship  and  political 
instability,  creating  faster,  sounder  and  also  more  ‗democratic‘  decision-making 
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processes. Especially the predominant role of executive organs in the creation of bodies 
to ―overcome the Euro Crisis strongly highlighted once again the necessity for better 
integration of democratic legitimated EU legislative bodies.
95 But similar issues will 
also have to be solved in relation to other policy fields than macro -economics.
96 The 
question is: how would such an integration of national parliaments look like in the 
future? 
The first possibility would be the creation of a new supranational body using 
already existing patterns which could be named the ―Committee of national legislators‖ 
and  would  consist  of  deputies  from  the  Member  States.  It  could  be  given  the 
competence to issue statements after being consulted on certain legislation and therefore 
enable the parliaments to take their stance from an ex-ante perspective. The new body 
could take the form of a kind of Conseil d‟État for the European Union.
97 Such a new 
body would consequently take a similar or possibly more prominent position as the 
already existing advisory institutions, namely the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of Regions.  
Theoretically, the second possibility could be an introduction of a new type of 
advisory or even judicial body considering the  ex-post perspective. In this scenario, 
national  parliaments  would  create  a  ―subsidiarity  tribunal‖  which  would  have  the 
capacity  to  rule  on  the  compatibility  of  EU  legislative  acts  with  the  subsidiarity 
principle. At first glance, one may envisage a conflict with Article 19.1 TEU, which 
gives the CJEU the sole right to interpretation of the law of the Union. But so far the 
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Luxembourg court has not laid down concrete definition of ―subsidiarity‖ in regard to 
its political dimension, leaving it merely as an abstract figure related with institutional 
balance. One can furthermore find arguments in the scientific literature that support a 
broadening of the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and 
this  would  in  a  sense  also  restrict  the  capacity  of  the  CJEU  itself.
98  Such  an 
understanding creates space for the creation of a new judicial body situated between the 
Union and the Member States.  
To improve the democratic  legitimisation of the rulings of this institution, its 
members could also be voted for by the national parliaments. For the creation of similar 
judicial bodies proposed candidates do have to fulfill objective requirements. This is 
especially useful in order to avoid a lack of quality and independence of the future 
officials,  which  is  often  regarded  to  be  the  major  disadvantage  of  an  electoral 
appointment of judges. As is already the case for the judges of the ECJ
99  and the 
ECHR,
100 a panel could be set up to hold hearings, which should be conducted in a 
transparent manner, ideally being public. 
Considering the division of political power and thinking ab out the possible 
consequences of creating these sketched new bodies, the change of ―role‖ of national 
legislators  from  decision-makers  to  supranational  organs  would  mean  a  loss  of 
influence. Carrying out a more detailed scrutiny however, one will balance this aspect 
with  the  current  situation,  which  sees  in  many  fields  the  erosion  of  national 
competences and therefore the almost total exclusion of national legislators from the 
political dialogue – especially with regard to the ex ante perspective. Furthermore, the 
currently effective early warning mechanism allows de facto solely an ex ante statement 
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considering a legislative act in relation to the subsidiarity principle and not beyond that 
narrow angle. 
Last  but  not  least,  the  direct  involvement  of  national  parliaments  within  the 
existing legislative triangle would also be a possibility. However, this scenario seems to 
be most unlikely, since the existing mechanisms are already pretty complex and the 
legislative barrier between national and EU politics would vanish entirely upon putting 
in place such a procedure. Therefore, the consequences of such a move can hardly be 
predicted. Most likely, an event like this would require basic changes of political and 
legal nature both in the Member States and the Union. 
Despite these objections, such a scenario is undoubtedly worth discussing. One 
possibility  would  be  the  creation  of  a  second,  federalist  chamber  of  the  European 
Parliament,  consisting  of  representatives  of  the  Member  States.
101  Such a chamber 
would be the counterpart to the European Parliament, as we know it, which is working 
with the assumption that it represents all Europeans as a single entity and not a Europe 
of different peoples. The competences of the new chamber would be similar to the 
chambers of regions in federal states. However, to avoid the creation of a European 
super-state, it would have to be strongly devoted to the principles of intergovernmental 
decision  making,  like  the  ―one  state,  one  vote‖  doctrine  mirroring  the  equality  of 
Member States regardless of their territorial size, population or economic power.
102 It is 
questionable however if  the chamber  would  not  lose its  intergovernmental  nature 
gradually over time, considering factual reasons and necessities to work together with 
the other institutions of the European Union. 
Another variant of that proposal involves the national parliaments directly. In 
certain key policy areas, like the annual budget of the European Union, legislators could 
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receive the right to be ―opting-out‖ of decisions made on the Union level. This could 
particularly be the case if such decisions entail the overtaking of significant positive 
duties for a single Member State in unusual circumstances.
103 It is clear that in the 
current situation such a proposal is being made by economically strong Member States 
in order to give their national parliaments more competences in the process of solving 
the European debt crisis.
104 However, the advantage of such a rule would be a gain for 
democratically legitimised decision making power on  the one hand, while the inner -
institutional balance and procedures in the EU itself would not have to be changed or 
disturbed  very  intensively.  On  the  other  side,  this  mechanism  would  most  likely 
improve uncertainty in situations which need clear and swift  decisions to be taken in 
order  to  be  solved  successfully.  Nevertheless,  it  is  certain  that  bringing  national 
parliaments on board in the EU decision-making process could significantly contribute 
to the improvement of accountability of both the European Un ion and the executive 
powers of the Member States.
105 This thought also leads back to the distinction between 
the  wider  and  the  narrow  meaning  of  the  term  ―democratic  deficit‖,  which  was 
mentioned at the beginning of this article.  
Arguably, there would be no problem of democratic legitimacy of decisions if 
competences  of  national  parliaments  would  be  entirely  shifted  to  the  European 
Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg. Even if, as pointed out earlier in this article, the 
European Parliament in its current form is a mosaic of fragments appointed through 
national voting procedures, it is very likely that this would soon change if only the 
majority of legislative procedures in the EU were dominated by the assembly. This 
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would also entail that the European Parliament becomes more than the co-legislator as it 
is now.  
In the current situation however, such a transfer of national competences to the 
higher  level  means  typically  taking  away  the  legislative  decision  from  national 
parliaments and moving it to a large extent into the hands of the Council, which consists 
of representatives from the national executive branches.
106 In other words, it is the lack 
of commitment of the Member States of the European Union to the organisation, which 
in effect results in a shift of legislative power from the legislative branch of a state to 
the combined executive branches of all Member States.  
A further approach for institutional reform was advocated in a working paper 
promoted by Council President Herman van Rompuy dealing with possible reactions on 
the Euro Crisis.
107 The paper was due to be discussed at a European Council meeting 
scheduled for the end of October 2012 and deals mainly with an integrated financial and 
budgetary framework for the Eurozone. However, the issue of impro ved democratic 
legitimacy in decision-making is also being addressed. The question being asked is, 
whether a more harmonised economic policy necessitates the creation of what is being 
called ―dedicated accountability structures specific to the euro area.‖
108 One could think 
here of the creation of a ―Eurozone Parliament.‖ Also the German government made 
similar  remarks  concerning  a  new  way  of  parliamentary  decision-making  combined 
with the strengthening of the position of the European Commission.
109  
Despite the fact that these proposals are still vague, what seems to be clear at 
first  glance  is  that  a  realisation  would  definitely  weaken  the  existing  national 
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parliaments as well as the European Parliament in its current form, making institutional 
interaction in the European Union even more complex. Besides, one would then have to 
ask ―which‖ European Union one would talk about, since the ―new‖ Parliament could 
well be regarded as the nucleus for a truly federal Union. Taking such a bold step seems 
to be rather unlikely given the current situation and especially in light of the fact that 
political tension in the Union overall seems to be rising. 
The final outcome of this discussion is still open. What seems to be becoming 
ever clearer is however, that the only sustainable way out of the crisis means stronger 
integration,  including  also  the  strengthening  of  democratic  legitimacy  and 
accountability as a factor of balance for stronger European institutions. Neither of the 
other two options on the table,
110 namely the intergovernmental approach represented 
through  institutions  like  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)  or  the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), nor legally, politically and not at least macro -
economically  questionable  interventions  of  already  exi sting  institutions  like  the 
European Central Bank will be able to end the continuing struggle. 
And finally, regarding all of this considerations and questions it has to be 
recognized  as  a  fact  that  Member  States‘  citizens  still  feel  mostly  attached  to  their 
national  identity,  blocking  the  path  to  ―the  easy  solution‖  and  demanding  a  more 
sophisticated approach to establishing new institutional balance.
111 
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Conclusion 
The reasoning behind the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national 
parliaments  was  connected  to  an  expectation  that,  collectively,  national  parliaments 
would inject democratic legitimacy to the European Union. Filling up the legitimacy 
gap within the European Union is needed especially now, when the sheer endless Euro 
Crisis seems to be transforming from a macro-economic phenomenon into a discourse 
about adequate EU governance structures. Additionally, the ―European idea‖ itself is 
being questioned, showing once more that even its own citizens do not really trust the 
Union and need to be convinced anew.
112  
The crucial decision Europeans must face is whether they regard a unified 
Europe as being part of their future or as being a failed project of the past. This decision 
will most likely be taken against the background of a r ational cost-benefit analysis,
 113 
even  if  the  ―Cost-of-Non-Europe‖-  narrative  can  and  should  not  be  the  only 
consideration of the Member States‘ citizens.
114 Nevertheless, the European Economic 
and  Social  Committee  adopted  on  the  18
th  of  September  2012  an  opinion,  which 
supports the creation of an ―updated study of the cost of non-Europe‖
115 following the 
original  idea  of  Paolo  Cecchini‘s  publication  from  1988.
116  Also  the  European 
Commission is following a similar path.
117 
What seems to be underestimated in the cur rent discussion however is that as 
with every kind of identity, a collective identity of the European Union is shaped by the 
three dimensions of past, present and future. In other words and if one follows the 
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philosophical roots of Martin Heidegger in this regard,
118 a strong belief in a common 
future in Europe already adds significantly to the existence of such an entity. Identity 
already comes into existence if there is a firm belief in a common project. Of course, 
such a process can only work when it is ta king place between partners sharing a 
common layer, which is set up by mutual standards. And this is where the link to 
democracy  and  the  issue  of  democratic  legitimisation  becomes  visible  and 
understandable. The reason why the European Union has so far been unable to gain the 
trust of the Member States‘ populations is that these shared standards have never been 
publically agreed upon. And even where they seem to exist in all Member States on a 
national level, the EU itself does not stick to them. This is especially true for the topic 
covered in this article. 
According  to  the  Treaty,  democratic  legitimacy  within  the  European  Union 
should be assured in a twofold manner.
119 First of all, by  strengthening the powers of 
the European  Parliament  and  successively  exte nding  the scope  of  the  co -decision 
procedure. Secondly, by reinforcing the powers of national parliaments, giving them 
more influence on EU affairs. The question that has to be answered is: is this really the 
best  way  of  addressing  the  democratic  deficit  a t  the  European  level?  The  EU 
institutional triangle seems to be already very complex and self-sufficient. Undeniably, 
the allocation of European institutional status to national parliaments would make the 
EU  structure  even  more  complicated  and  at  the  same  time  less  transparent.  The 
necessity of such repositioning of national parliaments is also questionable. Is the 
European Parliament, composed of directly elected MEPs, itself not enough to assure 
the appropriate level of democratic legitimacy within the European Union?  
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In  an era where everything seems  to  be put  in economic terms,  it is  almost 
astonishing that the Member States of the EU do not start to consider their transferred 
powers to the Union as a straight investment in a strict pragmatic sense. This thought 
also leads to the concept of a procedure of taking the power back from the Union, at 
least in theory or as a legal possibility, being laid down in specific procedures. The rules 
for  a  Member  State  to  leave  the  EU,  as  they  were  introduced  with  the  Treaty  of 
Lisbon,
120  are a first step in that direction. However, this basic idea of giving the 
Europeans actual choice would need to become more detailed and nuanced, being made 
available for certain policy areas of the Union. In this way a common ―Europe‖ could be 
transformed back from the ―common duty‖ of today into an opportunity for the future, 
as it was always intended to be. Some might fear a fragmentation or the creation of a 
―Europe  of  two  or  several  speeds‖  here.  But  considering  the  global  challenges  and 
factual necessities of our time, it is very likely that the European national states will 
work together in a constructive way. Despite being in dire straits, no Member State has 
chosen for itself to leave the Union, or even the Euro. Even the majority of Greeks are 
not in favour of an exit from the common currency, it is some representatives from 
other  Member  States  who  want  them  to  leave.
121  And  despite  the  Eurozone‘s  dull 
perspectives, prospective members are still trying to fulfil the criteria for joining the 
common currency.
122 It could well be argued that although there are large problems for 
the EU these days, it shows that it persists even under harsh conditions.  
However,  recent  expressions  of  some  heads  of  governments,  seemingly 
demanding  a  weaken ing  of  national  parliaments  in  the  decision -making  processes 
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addressing the solution of the Euro Crisis, have also clearly shown that the European 
public wishes for a strong role of their national parliaments in daily politics.
123 
The analysis of the new provisions on the role of national parliaments within the 
European Union provokes thought. One of the greatest powers of national parliaments 
introduced by the Treaty is the right to control compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. National parliaments participating in the monitoring of subsidiarity execute 
a supervisory function. The control they wield can be either  ex ante, by means of the 
early warning mechanism under Article 7 of Protocol No 2 or ex post by means of an 
indirect right to start proceeding before the CJEU under Article 8 of Protocol No 2. 
Maybe this is the direction that national parliaments should head for? Creating a kind of 
supervisory body, regardless of its form, national parliaments would not duplicate the 
existing European institutional structures and at the same time would remain important 
actors within the European Union.   
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